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ABSTRACT
Management of the business-government relationship is critical for firm performance in regulated industries.
In this paper, we predict a U-shaped relationship between product complexity and the time to approval by the
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Moreover, we argue that this association is contingent on the types
of strategic alliances (i.e., R&D alliance, Marketing alliance) of the focal firm in that those alliances help FDA
and pharmaceutical companies achieve harmony. Using the approved drugs by FDA from 1999 to 2016 as the
sample, our hypotheses are supported by the empirical analysis on US pharmaceutical firms. The findings have
important implications to achieving harmony between pharmaceutical firms and regulatory agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has brought light to some of the dilemmas in new drug
development and approval. New drug introduction to the market poses a double-edged sword for
governmental approval agencies such as the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA). While
governments certainly welcome the innovativeness and complexity of new drugs, they also desire to
control the pace of approval to identify safety problems (Carpenter, 2014). Obviously, the governmentbusiness relationship is very important for firm performance and firm survival. And it is especially
salient in regulated industries (Desai, 2016). Previous research on such relationships has been largely
focused on the effect of public policy on firm performance (Hiatt & Sine, 2014), the responses that
firms make to regulatory change (e.g., Kozhikode, 2016), and regulators’ responses to firms’ behaviors
(Heese, Krishnan, & Moers, 2015; Hiatt & Park, 2013). However, little is known about regulatory agency
responses to i) characteristics of firms’ outcomes (e.g., how complexity of regulated products affects
agency opinions), and ii) firms’ efforts to lower the information asymmetries between government
agencies and businesses (e.g., how firms signal quality of regulated products through the reputation
of their partners with whom they collaborate). Given the importance of product complexity in the
approval process of FDA, the lack of research on how product complexity in product regulatory
approval is certainly surprising. Our study fills this research gap by examining both the technical
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features of a product and market uncertainty that arises when firms launch these complex products.
Overall, government agencies are very powerful in regulated industries such as the pharmaceutical
industry. The FDA, for example, “sustains a battery of powers” (Carpenter, 2014, p.1) in testing,
marketing, labeling, advertising, and manufacturing of prescription drugs. In comparison,
corporations have more limited powers in highly regulated industries. One question that arises is
whether corporations can leverage their resources to gain power in the drug approval process to
receive more favorable outcomes. Our answer is yes, and we base this conclusion on the premise that
regulatory decisions are not based simply on power, but are determined by “a networked congeries
of audiences” such as consumers, media organizations, science and business communities, and
political forces (Carpenter, 2014, p10). Although there has been research examining the influence of
regulatory agencies on firm outcomes (e.g., Kozhikode, 2016), theoretical extensions have been
lacking. In this research, we argue that companies may leverage partnerships to expedite the approval
process for complex drugs. The authorization of an emergency use for the antiviral drug, Remdesivir,
is an example (FDA, 2020). In this paper, we argue that to promote social utility, government agencies,
as governing bodies, take on the responsibilities to protect the interests of principals (i.e., citizens) to
ensure an approved new drug “is almost certainly both safe and effective” (Carpenter, 2014, p.2). We
argue that product complexity and strategic alliances may align the interests of the government
agencies and the corporations, thus influencing the drug approval process.
By conducting this research, we make the following contributions. First, we examine the effect of
product complexity on new drug approval, which impacts not only many people’s lives but also the
financial performance of producing companies (Galambos & Sturchio, 1998). By examining the specific
contexts firms face when submitting drugs for regulatory approval, this study sheds light on how
social forces and product complexity are intertwined in the regulatory process. Second, the findings
of this study inform researchers about how the drug approval process is affected by product
complexity. Our research is among the first studies to address how firms’ partnerships alert
stakeholders to the qualities of complex products, and how product complexity impacts marketing
approval decisions by regulatory agencies. Third, from a methodological standpoint, we utilize a
measure of product complexity not previously used in management research. Previous research on
outcome complexity generally focuses on process complexity (Olausson & Berggren, 2010). Product
complexity has been previously measured through consumer and manager perceptions (e.g.,
Swaminathan, 2003, Novak & Eppinger, 2001). However, no management scholar to our knowledge
has objectively quantified product complexity. In the pharmaceutical industry, the chemical
characteristics of new drugs are the primary information that FDA regulators consider in the approval
process. Hence, we apply software used in chemical sciences to compute the molecular complexity of
the drug molecule based on the bond connectivity and element diversity. In essence, this technical
measure of product complexity provides a more objective way to capture the specific features of the
drug product, and which has a strong linkage to regulatory agencies.

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
PRODUCT COMPLEXITY AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Product complexity has been examined broadly across academic fields (e.g., Baldwin & Clark, 2000;
Chan, 2000). The major findings are that product complexity not only increases the product
enhancement effort (Banker et al., 1998) but also increases the interdependency among units within
a firm (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Winter & Szulanski, 2001). Specifically, high complexity demands
frequent communication between different units within a firm to make innovative upgrades or
modifications (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Furthermore, Henderson and Clark (1990) also argue that
__________________________________________________
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the organization teams should establish high understanding and interdependencies to develop more
complex products. Time to transfer complex technology or information is also required (Salomon &
Martin, 2003). Because of these elevated costs, firms may ignore customers desires for increasingly
complex products and focus on only incrementally innovative products (Ethiraj et al., 2012). In addition,
even within a firm, decision-makers can be reluctant to pursue complex projects since they often
require aggregation of dispersed information and heightened coordination (Henderson & Clark, 1990).
In the setting of government-business relationships such as FDA approval, the influence of product
complexity may entail additional complexity since it often involves collaboration among multiple firms
and public institutions.
Strategic alliances formed during new drug development can provide information to the FDA about
product quality that is otherwise unavailable, and, hence, collaboration often increases the likelihood
of pharmaceutical regulatory approval (Carpenter, 2014). Firms not only obtain complementary
resources from partners, but also achieve economies of scale/scope. The formation of alliances could
help firms to exchange resources and assess their values (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Saxton, 1997).
For instance, Li et al. (2008) find that partner selection acts as an important governance mechanism
to protect the intellectual property in the alliance entity. Leiblein and Reuer (2004) find that strategic
alliances can inhibit opportunistic behavior of the partners. These findings suggest that strategic
alliances could improve company performance. Alliances, therefore, can signal high levels of potential
product quality to regulatory agencies (Carpenter, 2014). Specifically, the characteristics of strategic
alliances could have significant effects on firm outcomes (e.g., Gulati & Higgins, 2003), such as
performance improvement (Sampson, 2007), knowledge acquirement (Novak & Eppinger, 2001), and
lower market uncertainty (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012). In this
paper, we argue that the effect of product complexity on time to approval is contingent on strategic
alliances.
THE CURVILINEAR EFFECT OF PRODUCT COMPLEXITY ON TIME TO APPROVAL
Product complexity could signal heightened advancement potential for the technology embedded in
the product. For drug companies, more complex drugs may experience quick approval from FDA,
given that both parties (pharmaceutical companies and FDA) share the same object of pushing the
effective drugs to the market as soon as possible. And some studies in medicinal chemistry have linked
molecular complexity to efficacy of drugs (e.g., Caille et al., 2019). As drugs become more disease
specific and safety requirements concomitantly increase, pharmaceutical development has
necessitated more chemical complex compounds (Walters, Green, Weiss, & Murcko, 2011). Therefore,
since speed to market of effective and safe treatments is one goal of the FDA, one would expect that
increasing product complexity may shorten the time to approval from FDA. Greater complexity tends
to suggest greater efficacy.
However, when product complexity is high, higher information asymmetry and concerns from FDA
may be elevated as well. Higher complexity creates greater difficulty in a regulatory agency’s
understanding a drug’s mechanisms, its adverse effects, and its unintended consequences. While the
producing firm may have detailed knowledge of the drug due to its experience with it in research and
development, regulatory agencies must rely on secondhand reports and filings for this knowledge
(e.g., Holmstrom, 1989). This asymmetry, in turn, may prolong the time required for a drug to receive
regulatory approval. Indeed, increases in chemical complexity often result in greater dissimilarity
between the focal and previous drugs, reducing regulators’ abilities to compare the focal drug with
previously considered therapies (Walter et al., 2011). Novelty, in turn, leads to unforeseen obstacles,
side-effects, and contingencies (e.g., Holmstrom, 1989), reducing likelihoods of approval.
__________________________________________________
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Further, highly complex products tend to be associated with technical uncertainty that may result
in ambiguity for regulatory agencies. Since highly complex products may have little structural similarity
to previous products, regulatory agencies will have relative few previous “models” on which to base
their decision (Holmstrom, 1989). These factors will tend to slow the process of regulatory approval.
Accordingly, we suggest that moderate levels of product complexity will lead to shortest approval
times for new pharmaceuticals. Moderate complexity levels provide enough complexity to ensure
novelty and chemical efficacy while mitigating against significant uncertainties that might cause delays
in the FDA approval process. Consistently, when product complexity is relatively low, increasing
product complexity may lead to shorter times to approval as efficacy rises with complexity. Rising
complexity and attendant efficacy compel the FDA to speed regulatory approval. After a midpoint of
complexity, however, increases in complexity reduce the FDA’s ability to process and understand
information in a timely manner. Increases in complexity at relatively high levels, therefore, increase
approval times. Hence, we expect that there is curvilinear relationship between product complexity
and time to approval from FDA.
Hypothesis 1: There is a U-shaped relationship between product complexity and time to approval
such that time to approval decreases from low to moderate product complexity and increases from
moderate to high product complexity.
THE MODERATING EFFECT OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
R&D ALLIANCES
For a complex product to receive regulatory approval, the producing company needs to provide
enough information so that the regulatory agency could evaluate the product in an objective and
complete manner. However, due to the difficulty a firm may have in transferring knowledge of
complex products to the regulatory agency (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Szulanski, 1996), the regulatory
agency will require considerable time to assess the feasibility and safety. We argue that strategic
alliances can aid firms in transferring information to regulatory agencies.
An R&D alliance is one of the major vehicles that firms pursue to develop advanced technology for
products or services, especially in the pharmaceutical industry (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Oxley &
Sampson, 2004; Sampson, 2007). R&D alliances could improve firms’ innovation performance
significantly compared with firms without R&D alliances (Sampson, 2007).
In the context of pharmaceutical industry, the involvement of an R&D partner when developing a
complex product indicates that the focal firm has invested a significant amount of time and energy to
produce the advanced technology (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). As noted, collaboration often
increases the likelihood of pharmaceutical regulatory approval (Carpenter, 2014). Firms obtain
complementary resources from partners and achieve economies of scale/scope. Strategic alliances can
inhibit the opportunistic behavior of the partners (Leiblein & Reurer, 2004), further improving alliance
performance. Hence, alliance can signal the reliability and feasibility of the technology thereby,
reducing the agency’s concerns on safety and adverse selection problem.
In sum, R&D alliances harmonize the joint effort by corporations and government agencies. R&D
agreements may reduce the cost associated with the drug development process (Shan, Walker, &
Kogut, 1994) and provide firms more access to financial resources (Gerlach, 1992). Further, R&D
alliances give government agencies assurance that technical uncertainty may be mitigated due to the
joint effort by several companies. Therefore, we predict that the time to get approved by regulatory
agency will be shortened as the focal firm has more partners in R&D alliances for a certain level of
product complexity.
__________________________________________________
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Hypothesis 2: The number of the focal firm’s partners in R&D alliance moderates the U-shaped
relationship between product complexity and time to approval in such a way that as the number
of R&D alliance partners increases, time to approval is reduced.
MARKETING ALLIANCES
Marketing alliances are an important vehicle used to build customer awareness and complement the
products from each partner (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993). Marketing alliances
involve the partners’ collaboration in the marketplace for increasing market share of each other’s
products (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993). These alliances allow partners to contribute their unique
resources and strengths to the partnership, in order to lower the market uncertainty associated with
the new product. Each company shares knowledge it has developed so that the likelihood of success
in launching the new product is higher (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Diestre & Rajagopalan,
2012).
Marketing alliances could benefit the partner firms in at least two ways. First, partners can acquire
from others new management and technological abilities (Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997), and
access scarce resource (Wernerfelt, 1984). Second, forming a marketing alliance with reputable
companies could lead to successful and innovative products since reputable partners provide a signal
of quality for the focal firm (Granovetter, 1985; Hill, 1990; Saxton, 1997).
In the context of pharmaceutical industry, the launch of a new drug is associated with the safety
and efficacy of the drug. Strategic marketing alliances are critically important for the introduction of
the new product, especially when there is technologically advanced knowledge represented in the
new product (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993). Regulatory agency may also use this signal as an indication
of the quality of the drug seeking regulatory approval. To some extent, marketing alliances could
signal the future market potential of the product once the product is launched. Therefore, we predict
that the number of marketing alliances in which a firm is involved also indicates harmony between
government agencies and the firm. Marketing alliances act as a signal to the regulatory agency,
thereby shortening approval times at all levels of complexity. In short, the number of marketing
alliances should moderate the relationship between product complexity and time to approval.
Hypothesis 3: The number of the focal firm’s partners in marketing alliances moderates the Ushaped relationship between product complexity and time to approval in such a way that as the
number of partners in marketing alliances increases, time to approval is reduced.

METHODS
Data on New Molecular Entity and New Biologic drugs (NMEs) approved by US Food and Drug
Administration from 1999 to 2016 was collected. NMEs cover a significant amount of customer market
in U.S. Although there are significant differences in the structure of NME drugs and biologic drugs, the
measurement used in this study is easily applied to both categories of drugs. Our sample consists of
482 FDA approved drugs in 18 years.
The Medtrack database was used to obtain the firm and chemistry data that is associated with each
drug. Medtrack has been used in research about pharmaceutical industry (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012;
Diestre, Rajagopalan, & Dutta, 2015) to provide firm-level information such as firm size, age,
performance, R&D alliances, marketing alliances, corporate venture activities, and patent portfolios
of firms across 17 therapeutic markets. Medtrack provides the marketed drugs and newly developed
drugs for each firm as well as the active ingredient involved in each drug. The database also contains
information regarding development stages of each drug, such as Research, Preclinical, Phase I, Phase
__________________________________________________

40

T. Su, W. Hou, E. Levitas, and S. Wu

American Business Review 24(1)

II, Phase III, Pending Approval, Approved, and Marketed. Each drug has a specific therapeutic domain
based on its therapeutic properties and it contains a chemistry identifier.
PubChem database, an open source database, was used to collect the chemical structure
information of each drug. The PubChem is a chemistry database which indexes all disclosed molecules
in chemistry fields and assigns a Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) number to each drug. By using CAS
as the identifier, the chemical structure of each drug in our sample was specified and codified in
PubChem database. Then a structural and elemental code of the drug molecule was used to compute
the drug’s complexity. Firm level data was collected from Compustat Industrial Annual database.
482 FDA approved drugs in 18 years consist of our sample. There are missing values about the
development history in Medtrack database, which reduced our sample size. Moreover, other missing
values about firm size and firm performance reduced our sample size to 344 observations.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Time to Approval was measured as the number of days between the start of Preclinical development
and the date of approval by FDA.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Product Complexity is measured by the molecular complexity of each drug. Each drug’s molecular
complexity is measured using PaDel-Descriptor. This open source software is a common tool in
chemistry fields and has been used to compute molecule's various characteristics (Tripathi & Kumar,
2013; Yap, 2011). The molecular complexity in PaDeL-Descriptor measures a molecule's fragment
complexity including functional groups, bonds, and the diversity of chemistry elements. PaDelDescriptor uses the formula developed by Hendrickson et al. (1987) that has been considered as the
primary measure of product complexity and can be applied to more different types of molecules than
other methods. Complexity is calculated via the following functions:
𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶𝜂𝜂 + 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸

(1)
(2)

𝐶𝐶𝜂𝜂 = 2𝜂𝜂 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝜂𝜂 − 𝛴𝛴𝑖𝑖 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖

(3)

𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐸𝐸 − 𝛴𝛴𝑗𝑗 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗

The measure of molecular complexity (C) is a sum of two parts (equation 1): the first term 𝐶𝐶𝜂𝜂
measures skeletal complexity as a function of bond connectivity (𝜂𝜂); the second term, 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 , is a function
of the diversity of elements, or atoms. Each of these terms also is composed of two parts: first
(equation 2), an overall complexity term; and second (equation 3), a symmetry term subtracted from
it to reduce the complexity to the extent that symmetry is present. This calculation integrates skeletal
complexity as a function of bond connectivity and the diversity of elements. Therefore, our measure
of molecular complexity is comprehensive and counts both structural diversity and the elemental
diversity. PaDel-Descriptor uses the approach introduced by Hendrickson et al (1987) to compute the
element complexity (Equation 3). Here, the work of Hendrickson et al (1987) is briefly introduced again
to show the calculation of complexity, including the following equations and its derivatives. Although
one can calculate molecular complexity based on three equations above, certain characteristics of
atoms in molecule could be utilized to simplify the calculation such as Equation 2. In Equation 2, the
computation of 𝜂𝜂 for the whole molecule could use the following equation:
__________________________________________________
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𝜂𝜂 = 1/2 ∑𝑖𝑖(4 − ℎ𝑖𝑖 )(3 − ℎ𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝐷𝐷 − 3𝑇𝑇

(4)

In Equation 4, ℎ is the number of hydrogens on each non-hydrogen atoms. 𝐷𝐷 is the number of
double bonds. 𝑇𝑇 is the number of triple bonds. Due to the different types of bond connectivity, the
second item in Equation 2 is more complicated, given that central atom could have different patterns
of symmetry term 𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 . Therefore, the second item in Equation 2 becomes the add-up of symmetry term
𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 of all equivalent atoms that follow the same pattern of symmetry. Then Equation 2 is derived to the
following equation:
𝐶𝐶𝜂𝜂 = 2𝜂𝜂 lg 𝜂𝜂 − ∑𝑖𝑖(𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 )𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘 = (3 − ℎ)(2 − ℎ) + R

(5)
(6)

k is the value of symmetry type; h is the number of hydrogen atom. Please refer to the work of
Hendrickson et al (1987) for detailed information about the equations.
For the purpose of demonstration, here we choose two drugs (Replax and Reyataz) as the
examples to show the molecular complexity. Figure 1 shows the chemistry structures of Replax and
Reyataz. As can be seen, Replax (complexity=346.9) is less complex than Reyataz
(complexity=841.44). Our data indicates that Replax took around 4 years to get approved by FDA,
while Reyataz took around 9 years to get approved.

Figure 1. The Chemistry Structure of Replax and Reyataz
R&D Alliance is measured as the total number of partners in R&D alliance that the firm has for
developing one focal drug.
Marketing Alliance is measured as the total number of partner companies that the focal company
has for marketing the new drug.

__________________________________________________
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CONTROL VARIABLES
To mitigate confounding effect, various firm level variables were included in the analysis. Firm size
was measured as the number of employees (Miller & Cardinal, 1994; Zhang et al., 2007), and was
obtained from the Compustat database. Firm size is logarithmically transformed in the model. Past
firm performance is measured as return on assets (ROA) in the previous year (Wowak et al., 2011). In
pharmaceutical firms, research and development expense is very important for developing new drugs.
High R&D expense could signal the technical reliability of the new drug. Therefore, R&D expense on
drug developments was also controlled. Firm leverage to control for the firm’s tendency to use debt
capital was also included as a control variable. This variable was measured as the ratio of total debt to
total assets in order to control for the effect of firms' differences in capital on the choice of drug
development (Geringer et al., 2000; Tallman & Li, 1996). To partial out the effects of
macroenvironment, year fixed effect was also included in the analysis.
EMPIRICAL METHOD
The dependent variable is the number of days from the application of drug to the drug gets
approved by FDA, which is a count variable and only takes non-negative integer values. Ordinary Least
Square (OLS) regression assumes homoskedastic and normal distribution of error terms. The counted
nature of our dependent variable violates those two assumptions. Therefore, negative binomial
regression (which accounts for a Poisson distribution of our dependent variable) was used to estimate
our empirical models (e.g., George, Wiklund, & Zahra, 2005; Sanders, 2001). In order to address
potential multicollinearity problems, all the independent variables (except the year dummy variables)
are standardized before entering the empirical analysis. All the values of the variance inflation factor
(VIF) are lower than 4.95 in all the models, below the threshold value of 10 (Neter et al., 1985). So,
multicollinearity is not a concern in our analysis.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations, and correlations are provided in Table
1. The average time to get approved by FDA is 1,014 days (3 years), which is consistent with the previous
findings (Choi & Contractor, 2016; Munos, 2009; Scillittoe et al., 2015). Firm leverage is negatively
correlated with the time to get approved (-0.11, p < 0.05). R&D alliance is also negatively correlated
with time to approval (-0.12, p < 0.05).

__________________________________________________
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Std
Variable
Mean
Dev
1
2
1. Time to
Approval
10.14
10.25
(hundred)

3

4

2. Firm Sizea

3.45

1.82

0.10+

3. R&D
Expense
(million)

3.92

2.86

-0.06

0.68***

4. Firm
Leverage

0.12

0.11

-0.11*

-0.20***

-0.10+

5. Firm
Performance 0.08

0.11

0.08

0.54***

0.16**

-0.24*

5

6

6. Product
Complexity
(thousand)

0.34

1.12

0.08

-0.01

-0.08

-0.13

0.05

7. R&D
Alliance

2.24

1.72

-0.12*

-0.25***

0.05

0.05

-0.26***

-0.04

8. Marketing
Alliance

4.16

5.16

-0.07

-0.01

0.03

0.02

0.09

0.14*

7

0.31***

N=344
a Logarithmically transformed
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 2 presents the regression results of testing our hypotheses. Model 1 includes control
variables, Model 2 includes controls and the main effect of product complexity, and Model 3 includes
controls, main effects, and the moderating effects of R&D alliance. Model 6 includes controls, main
effects, and the moderating effects of Marketing Alliance. The results of Model 1 show that R&D
expense (-0.593, p < 0.01) and firm leverage (-0.234, p < 0.01) significantly decrease the time to
approval. However, firm size increases the time to approval (0.781, p < 0.001), indicating that bigger
firms tend to take longer time to get approved by FDA.
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Table 2. The Effect of Product Complexity on Time to Approval
Variables
Firm Size
R&D Expense
Firm Leverage
Firm Performance
R&D Alliance
Marketing Alliance
Product Complexity
Product
Complexity_Squared
Product Complexity X
R&D Alliance
Product
Complexity_Squared X
R&D Alliance
Product Complexity X
Marketing Alliance
Product
Complexity_Squared X
Marketing Alliance
Constant
Oberservations
Log Pseudolikelihood
Wald Chi-squared
Firm Size
R&D Expense
Firm Leverage
Firm Performance
R&D Alliance
Marketing Alliance
Product Complexity
Product
Complexity_Squared
Product Complexity X
R&D Alliance
Product
Complexity_Squared X
R&D Alliance
Product Complexity X
Marketing Alliance
Product
Complexity_Squared X
Marketing Alliance
Constant
Oberservations
Log Pseudolikelihood
Wald Chi-squared

Model 1
0.781***
(0.196)
-0.593**
(0.194)
-0.234**
(0.090)
-0.176*
(0.079)
0.082
(0.071)

Model 2
0.784***
(0.194)
-0.635**
(0.193)
-0.260**
(0.089)
-0.126
(0.078)
0.108
(0.073)

Model 3
0.789***
(0.195)
-0.692***
(0.190)
-0.267**
(0.091)
-0.116
(0.077)
0.292*
(0.133)

0.277**

-0.409

(0.296)

-0.195

(0.303)

0.092*

(0.042)

0.020

(0.040)

0.964+

(0.521)

-0.212**

(0.069)

(0.097)

8.756***
(0.382)
344
-2889.9
262.4***
Model 4
0.763***
(0.199)
-0.576**
(0.196)
-0.239**
(0.089)
-0.201**
(0.076)

8.5588***
(0.393)
344
-2887.9
311.2***
Model 5
0.766***
(0.198)
-0.616**
(0.195)
-0.267**
(0.090)
-0.162*
(0.075)

8.552***
344
-2882.1
316.4***

(0.386)

0.049
0.266**

0.076
-0.426

(0.065)
(0.301)

0.173*
-0.823*

(0.068)
(0.420)

0.092*

(0.042)

0.148**

(0.053)

0.533*

(0.225)

-0.088**

(0.029)

8.364***
344
-2883.4
294.6***

(0.416)

8.751***
344
-2890.1
245.6***

(0.064)
(0.097)

(0.383)

8.553***
344
-2888.2
280.1***

(0.395)

Model 6
0.813***
(0.197)
-0.715***
(0.196)
-0.287**
(0.087)
-0.136+
(0.072)

N=344. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies are not reported here for brevity.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Two-tailed tests.
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Hypothesis 1 predicted that a curved relationship between product complexity and the time to get
approved. The results of Model 2 and Model 5 in Table 2 show that the beta coefficient of the squared
term of product complexity is significantly related to the approval time (β = 0.092, p < 0.05; β = 0.092,
p < 0.05). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. Model 5 confirms this supporting. Figure 2 depicts the
relationship between product complexity and time to approval. The values of product complexity are
taken as the percentiles in the sample. As product complexity increases, time to approval is shortened.
However, higher product complexity leads to longer time to approval as product complexity is high,
which confirms the curve-shaped relationship.
Hypothesis 2 proposed that the relationship between product complexity and approval time will
be moderated as the number of a firm’s partners in R&D alliance increases in such a way that time to
approval is shortened for either low complex or high complex products. The results of Model 3 in Table
2 indicate that R&D alliance has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between time to
approval and the squared term of product complexity (β = -0.212, p < 0.01). Figure 3 is generated to
present this negative moderating effect. The values of R&D alliance are taken as one standard
deviation below and above the mean value. The values of product complexity are taken as the
percentiles in the sample. As shown, as the number of partners in R&D alliance increases, approval
time is shortened for either low product complexity or high product complexity. Therefore, Hypothesis
2 is supported. The post estimation analysis indicates that time to approval decreases 317 days when
increasing forming one more partner in R&D alliance at the average level of product complexity.

Figure 2. The Effect of Product Complexity on Time to Approval
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Figure 3. The Moderating Effect of R&D Alliance on the Relationship between Product Complexity
and Time to Approval
Hypothesis 3 states that a firm’s marketing alliances moderate the U-shaped relationship between
product complexity and time to approval in such a way that as the number of the focal firm’s partners
in marketing alliances increases, time to approval is shortened for either low complex or high complex
products. The results of Model 6 in Table 2 show that marketing alliances significantly moderate the
effect of product complexity squared (β = -0.088, p < 0.01). Figure 4 also shows the significant
moderating effect of marketing alliances. It shows that as the number of partners in marketing
alliances increases, the approval time is shortened. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported. The post
estimation analysis indicates that time to approval decreases 90 days when there is one more partner
in marketing alliance at the average level of product complexity.
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Figure 4. The Moderating Effect of Marketing Alliance on the Relationship between Product
Complexity and Time to Approval
Since our interest in this research is about the relationship between product complexity and time
to approval, only approved drugs are included in the sample. On one hand, this sampling to some
extent matches our research questions and theoretical development. However, it may potentially
introduce selection bias problem. Therefore, to address this problem, a Heckman Selection analysis
was conducted by using the sample of 344 approved drugs and 160 failed drugs. A Probit regression
was performed in the first stage. In the first stage, a binary variable created to indicate whether the
drug was approved by the FDA or failed in clinical trials. This dichotomous variable was then regressed
on firm size, R&D expense, molecular complexity, the number of indications, and the pharmaceutical
class of the drug. An inverse Mills ratio generated from the first stage and controlling for the degree
to which selection bias affects contaminates our estimations was added into the models in the second
stage for predicting the time to approval. The results of the Heckman selection analysis are very
consistent with the main results reported in the paper.

DISCUSSION
Our study extends the research about government-business relationships from the responses of the
company to regulatory agencies. We argue that companies need to address technical uncertainty and
market uncertainty associated with complex products in order to get products approved. The
formation of strategic alliances, such as R&D alliance and marketing alliance could address this
problem. By taking a sample of drug molecules from U.S. pharmaceutical companies, we find that
there is a U-shaped relationship between product complexity and time to approval by FDA. This finding
indicates that it takes shorter time for FDA to approve a new drug with increasing product complexity
when product complexity is low. However, when product complexity is high, the FDA may require
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more evidence to lower the technical uncertainty, increasing the time needed to reach the harmony
between corporations and regulatory agency. As predicted, we find a negative moderating effect of
R&D alliance and marketing alliance on the relationship between product complexity and time to
approval, indicating that those two types of strategic alliances could lower the technical uncertainty
and market uncertainty surrounding a new drug.
Our findings have important theoretical and practical implications. First, we extend the research on
government-business relationships to the government side by considering product complexity and
regulatory approval. The seminal work of Simonin (1999) tested the relationship between complexity
and ambiguity in strategic alliances. As far as we know, no other research tests the characteristics of
organizational output on the response from the regulatory agency. Our findings demonstrate that
product complexity does have significant influences on the decision making of regulatory agencies.
Second, our findings indicate that regulatory agencies are concerned about technical uncertainty. The
characteristics of the focal firm shifts the concerns in different ways. Third, our study demonstrates
the contingency effect of R&D alliance partners and marketing alliance partners in the regulatory
approval process. Therefore, the relationship between product complexity and the time to approval
is contextually dependent.
Although our theoretical predictions and empirical findings indicate that firms form strategic
alliances to signal the high safety and market potential for the new drugs, focal firms are not
necessarily expected to game the system. Previous research about “cheap talk” (Crawford & Sobel,
1982) and lying (e.g., Gneezy, Kajackaite, & Sobel, 2018) shows that it is unlikely for focal firms to form
strategic alliances with an intention of misrepresentation or absent efficacy. Purposeful lying won’t
occur when there are significant costs associated with lying, such as tarnished reputation, damaged
public image concern etc. (e.g., Abeler, Becker, & Falk, 2014; Dreber & Johannesson, 2008; Mazar,
Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Gneezy, Kajackaite, and Sobel (2018) found that there are intrinsic costs
associated with lying, depending on the magnitude of the lie. In new drug approval, focal firms usually
make public announcement about strategic alliance partners. The public announcements would incur
significant responses from shareholders and other important stakeholders (including judicial
authorities) if these were misrepresentations. Moreover, the FDA review process could also guarantee
the reliability of the new drugs, further decreasing the possibility of “cheap talk.” Therefore, even
though there is a possibility that the focal firm may send false signals (e.g., by lying about strategic
alliance formation), the scrutiny by the public and the FDA will most likely alert stakeholders to these
transgressions.
Our study is not without limitations which may offer the directions for future research. First,
product complexity may have different effects on firm performance over time. For instance, complex
products may take longer for the market to accept, leading to lower sales than less complex products
at the initial stage of launch. However, at later stages, complex products may have more sales than
less complex products due to the advantage in technology and safety. Therefore, future research
could investigate how product complexity influences sales over time. Second, product similarity is
another feature of the drug molecule which may interact with product complexity in affecting the
decision of regulatory agency. Some products may be complex but similar to the products in other
companies. Future research should address the effects product similarity has on regulatory approval.
Third, due to the difficulty and availability of the data collection, FDA membership and philosophy was
not well controlled in our empirical model. Future research may investigate the contingent factors
from the FDA side about the relationship between product complexity and time to approval.
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CONCLUSION
By taking a sample of drug molecules from pharmaceutical companies, we tested the association
between product complexity and the time to approval by FDA. We find that there is a U-shaped
relationship between product complexity and time to approval by FDA. We also find that the
relationship between product complexity and the time to approval depends on the strategic alliances
the focal firms have. We believe this study will provide new avenues for research in product complexity
and offer more insights in the advancement of understanding about government-business
relationship.
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